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Abstract: 
Trust and trustworthiness are key elements, both at the micro and macro level, in 
sustaining the working of modern economies and their institutions. However, 
despite its centrality, trust continues to be considered as a “conceptual bumblebee”, 
it works in practice but not in theory. In particular, its behavioural rationale still 
represents a puzzle for traditional rational choice theory and game theory. In this 
paper “trust responsiveness”, an alternative explanatory principle that can account 
for trustful and trustworthy behaviour, is proposed. Such principle assumes that 
people can be motivated to behave trustworthily by trustful actions. The paper 
discusses the philosophical roots, the historical development, as well as the relational 
nature of this principle as well as its theoretical implications. 
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Trust Responsiveness:  
On the Dynamics of Fiduciary Interactions 
 
 
 
 
That reason, passion, answer one great aim; 
That true self-love and social are the same; 
That virtue only makes our bliss below;  
And all our knowledge is, ourselves to know.  
 
Alexander Pope, Essay on Man IV 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to John Locke, trust and trustworthiness constitute the 
vinculum societatis, the bond of society (1660/1954), namely, the quality of 
interpersonal relationships which makes people’s agreements work. 
Without trust our societies would collapse into a Hobbesian “state of 
nature”. More recently, it has also been argued that even the market order 
needs a certain amount of trust diffused among the agents as a 
precondition for its efficient functioning (Bruni & Sugden, 2000). Thus, 
trust and trustworthiness are perceived as being key elements, both at the 
micro and macro level, in sustaining the working of modern societies and 
their institutions. However, despite its centrality, trust continues to be 
considered as a “conceptual bumblebee”, it works in practice but not in 
theory. In particular, its behavioural rationale still represents a puzzle for 
traditional game theory, the theory of strategic interactions. This 
unsatisfactory state of affairs has recently stimulated the development of 
several alternative models of strategic behaviour that incorporate altruist 
(Margolis, 1982), inequity averse (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), team-thinking 
(Sugden, 1993) and reciprocal (Rabin, 1993) agents, proposed to 
disentangle the theoretical and empirical puzzle of pro-social behaviour.  
 In this paper “trust responsiveness”, an alternative explanatory 
principle that can account for trustful and trustworthy behaviour, is 
proposed and discussed. Such a principle assumes that people can be 
2
 motivated by trustful actions to behave trustworthily. The relational 
nature of this principle and its implications are discussed. 
  While most of the other behavioural principles among those 
quoted above have been the focus of a huge literature and have 
benefited from extensive analysis, the idea of trust responsiveness is 
relatively new. Such a novelty reflects on a lack of philosophical 
foundations and context. The trust responsiveness hypothesis has 
received considerable empirical support from a number of experimental 
studies (Bacharach et al., 2004; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Pelligra, 
2002, 2005), yet they all remain silent about its more general rationale. In 
this paper I will try to fill this gap by creating a context and by 
introducing some foundational elements that may philosophically 
establish the concept. The relational nature of the concept will be 
explored and used to differentiate trust responsiveness from any 
alternative explanations.   
 
 
2. Trust and its elements. 
 
To isolate the basic elements involved in a trusting interaction we 
may use the Trust Game depicted in figure 1. Such an interaction 
summarises the most important elements involved in a trusting situation: 
i) potential positive consequences for the trustor: described by 
c>a 
ii) potential negative consequences for the trustor: described 
by b<a; 
iii) temptation for the trustee or risk of opportunism for the 
trustor: formalised by e>f; 
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 Figure 1. “The Trust Game” 
                 Player A 
 
                                                  L        R 
      
                    Player B 
 
                                                   L      R   
      
      a    b          c 
      d          e          f        
  
 
b<a<c; f<e;  
 
 In this game Player A (trustor) can first choose either L or R; in 
choosing L players get a payoffs pair equal to (a,d). But if A chooses R, 
the choice passes to B (trustee), who, in turn, can choose either L or R. 
In the first case B gets e and A, b; in the second case B gets f and  A gets 
c. When A plays R she is said to be trustful; when B plays R he is said to 
be trustworthy or, when he plays L, opportunistic. What is worth 
noticing is that a rational choice account of agents’ behaviour in such a 
situation suggests that B would play L and that consequently, by 
backward induction, A would play L as well.1 This strategy pair 
determines an equilibrium outcome that is inefficient compared to the 
one that could be obtained from a couple of trustful and trustworthy 
choices.  
 Thus, within the framework of game theory, trustful and 
trustworthy behaviours cannot be explained as patently irrational. This 
results casts serious doubts about the usefulness of such a narrow 
concept of strategic rationality. As stressed by Martin Hollis, in fact, – 
“Reason should be able to show us what makes for a reliable social order, 
where people find it rational to trust one another. Yet, at least in some 
                                                 
1 The strategy pair (L,L) is a subgame perfecr Nash equilibrium of the “Trust 
Game”. 
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 current versions, it apparently bids us to play the games of social life in 
ways which make losers of us all. This applies especially to the suggestions 
that trust is a matter of mutual self-interest" (1998, p.44). Where should we 
look for inspiration? How to supplement game theoretic models in order 
to make them capable of  incorporating such a crucial social element?   
 
 Responsive trust is the particular conception of trust I aim to 
discuss here. This variant considers trust as a “relational” concept that 
can only be defined by focussing on the interaction between subjects’ 
(trustor and trustee) intentions and actions and not merely by referring 
to the consequences of their actions. The main feature of trust, in this 
particular meaning, refers to the fact that an explicit act of trust has the 
peculiarity of “inducing” or “eliciting”, to some degree, a trustworthy 
response. In this respect, trust is said to be responsive or self-fulfilling. 
This particular conception highlights some important aspects that other 
conceptions of trust tend to disregard as, for instance, its relational 
nature - that will be diffusely discussed below-. An act of trust implies a 
relation between two subjects. Altruism, inequity-aversion and team-
thinking models depict subjects that are “closed” to mutual influences. 
Their actions and beliefs are not affected in any way by a single act of 
trust. One’s trustfulness and trustworthiness are exogenously given in all 
the three “non-responsive” conceptions. More specifically, all the 
potential reasons why one should be trustworthy are independent of the 
act of trust and are considered exogenous. Contrastingly, the  responsive 
version assumes that at least some of the reasons underlying 
trustworthiness are endogenously produced within the relation by the act 
of trust itself. 
 
 
3. Trust responsiveness. 
 
Suppose we have two agents, A and B2. According to the “trust 
responsiveness hypothesis”, B’s trustworthiness may be induced by A 
when she manifestly and consciously chooses a trustful course of action. 
This kind of inducement assumes the existence of a psychological 
mechanism according to which A’s trustful action motivates B to reward 
such a trustfulness, making him behave trustworthily, even though such 
behaviour implies some material cost.  
                                                 
2 I will be using “she” for A and “he” for B. 
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  As far as I know, the first mention of a similar process, defined 
as “therapeutic trust”, can be found in Horsburgh’s 1960 paper. 
According to this view, in a situation similar to that described in the 
Trust Game, “One of the reason for (A’s) willingness to risk the loss of 
his money is a belief that this may induce (B) to act more honourably 
than he originally intended”. Following Horsburgh, “therapeutic trust” is 
defined as  a “reliance which aims at increasing the trustworthiness of 
the person in whom it is placed” (1960, p.346). A peculiar aspect of 
“therapeutic trust” is that it requires the person trusted to be aware of 
the reasons for the trust which is placed in him and that the trustful 
action explicitly aims at increasing the trustee’s trustworthiness. One 
episode of Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables exemplifies well such an extreme 
form of trust. In his book Hugo tells the story of the human resurrection 
of Jean Valjean who, after having been kept in prison for nineteen years 
(five years for house-breaking and burglary; fourteen years for having 
attempted to escape on several occasions) struggles for the rest of his life 
to become an honest men. The turning point of his story from evil to 
good is the protagonist’s encounter with Bishop Myriel. One night, 
having been released from prison, Jean Valjean was wandering looking 
for a place to spend the night. Having been thrown out from all the inns, 
he knocked at the bishop’s door. Without revealing his identity, the 
bishop gave him an unexpectedly warm welcome, a dinner and a clean 
bed to sleep. As a response, Valjean disappears during that night Jean 
with the house silverware.  
 The day after, having been caught by the police, Jean Valjean is 
taken back to the bishop’s house for inquiries. When the bishop sees 
him he does not accuse him, on the contrary, he guarantees for him and 
lets him go with the loot. Just before he is released, the bishop 
approaches him and says in his ear: “Do not forget, never forget (…) 
Jean Valjean, my brother, you no longer belong to evil, but to good. It is 
your soul that I buy from you; I withdraw it from black thoughts and the 
spirit of perdition, and I give it to God". The action of letting him go can 
be seen as an extreme form of therapeutic trust, as conceived by 
Horsburgh, that, in that case, successfully triggers Jean Valjean’s resolute 
will of redemption. 
 
 Other forms of “responsive trust”, less extreme or purposive, 
have been described especially in the philosophical literature. Recently 
Philip Petitt (1995)  has suggested a particular use of the term trust 
(trustfulness in our terminology) as interactive reliance. We observe an 
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 instance of interactive reliance when, while relying on B, A thinks that 
her manifest reliance will strengthen B’s existing reasons to do that 
which A relies on him to do. That is so because A believes that, once her 
reliance is manifested, the utility B gets from fulfilling A’s expectations 
increases with the recognition that doing so will serve A’s purposes. The 
reasons why the trustee’s utility would increase by behaving trustworthily 
in that given situation may have to do, according to Pettit, both with 
endogenous traits displayed by the trustee and with an endogenous 
process of belief formation. Consider such first traits as loyalty, virtue 
and prudence. If A knows that B is a loyal individual, she has ground for 
trusting him; for B fulfilling that trust would mean being reinforced in 
his reputation for being loyal. Suppose now B has a desire for a virtuous 
life. A’s act of trust gives him the opportunity (by showing 
trustworthiness) of conforming to that ideal of virtuous life, thus 
fulfilling his appetite for virtuousness. The third reason why the trustee’s 
utility would increase by being trustworthy is related, according to Pettit, 
to considerations of prudence. If B is interested in starting and 
supporting a long-term relationship, then he may be motivated to refrain 
from opportunism. Trustworthiness would assure him of a longstanding 
relationship with A and consequently with all the opportunities for 
increasing his utility that may derive from it. However, this kind of 
explanation is not particularly original, as it refers to a mix of 
encapsulated and long-run self-interest. The second part of Pettit’s 
explanation, however, is more interesting for my purposes, as it refers to 
the existence of an original desire for the good opinion of the others. 
Such a desire, according to Pettit, represents a shameful disposition, not 
a trait that many will be proud to acknowledge. The existence of this 
desire implies that by manifesting her reliance, A is implicitly signalling 
her belief about B’s trustworthiness. For B that belief constitutes a 
valuable good that, however, can only be enjoyed by actually behaving 
trustworthily. 
 Other scholars have stressed this point. According to Jonathan 
Baron, for instance, “Following the norm of trust has an effect on both 
the beliefs and the norms of others. It creates a virtuous circle (…) if we 
act as if we expect the best from the others, they will often behave better 
as a result” (Baron, 1998, p. 411). A similar process has been the focus of 
many psychological studies. In his review of this strand of literature, Lee 
Jussim (1986) describes and analyses those situations in which one 
person’s expectations about a second person lead the latter to act in ways 
that confirm the first person’s expectation.    
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  Besides philosophers, sociologists and psychologists, economists 
too, have recently begun to notice the peculiarity of this trust 
mechanism. Some insights can be found in Dasgupta, who recognises 
that “the mere fact that someone has placed his trust in us makes us feel 
obligated, and this makes it harder to betray that trust” (1988, p.54). 
 One of the conclusions that we may infer from this literature is 
the idea that, given certain conditions, there is a natural tendency to fulfil 
the expectations that others have explicitly manifested by trusting us. 
Despite a diffuse agreement about this point, very few attempts have 
been made to trace the roots and explore the functioning of such a 
disposition. This will be the aim of the following sections.  
 
 
4. Interactive motivation: the source of trust responsiveness. 
 
 Pettit advanced a potential explanation for the mechanism of 
Trust Responsiveness grounded on the idea that, as social individuals, we 
care about the good opinion of the others. By fulfilling the other’s trust 
we confirm the other’s good opinion (which is the fundamental  reason 
for their trust in us), and that indirectly increases our own welfare, 
despite the fact that trustworthiness implies some material costs. Our 
actual behaviour will result in the epiphenomenon of that balance 
between material and psychological benefits and costs. Pettit’s theory is 
built around what he calls a “shameful disposition”. I think, however, 
that, though crucial, this motive should not be considered as the ultimate 
source of trustworthiness. It is also important to make clear that having a 
desire for the good opinion of the others should not always be 
considered “shameful”. There is a range of motives that goes from 
vanity to the genuine desire of being praiseworthy, that springs from the 
desire for the good opinion of the others, and  each of those motives has 
a very different moral status.  
 I shall focus here, in particular, on the evolution of the concept 
of self-love, in its broadest sense of “desire for the good opinion of the 
others”. Such a desire is seen as the core of our social interactions, and it 
needs to be analysed in its different forms and dynamics.   
On the one hand, we have the position developed mainly by 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Mandeville, according to which the 
mere pursuing of self-love is necessarily a source of conflict, while on the 
other, we have the champions of the idea of self-love as a source of love 
for others. There is also a third position personified mainly by Hume and 
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 Smith that aims at the reduction of such a dichotomy through a 
purification of self-love moral status. In what follows, I will focus mainly 
on the latter perspective.  
Aristotle’s theory of sociality constitutes the departing point of both 
Hume’s and Smith’s systems. Its pivotal element is the concept of 
philautia (literally “self-love”). Philautia is the source of philia or 
friendship, which is the source of self-knowledge and self-consciousness 
in Aristotle’s system. It is by virtue of this mirroring process that in a 
friendly relation one has the opportunity to develop all her virtues. That 
is the reason why, according to Aristotle, self-love represents the 
bedrock of moral development and flourishing.  
 Hume’s position (1739, 1751) goes explicitly against both cold 
cynicism (Hobbes) and candid optimism (Hutcheson), as he maintains 
that behaviour should be explained through a mix of coexisting self-
interest and benevolence. His crucial assumption is that of an innate 
sense of sympathy that generates the basic human propensity to sociality. 
It is through sympathy that we assess whether our actions are “useful” or  
“pernicious” for the others. Such an assessment is, in turn, the basis for 
the establishment of a sense of justice and honesty. That is why virtue is 
considered desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, “merely 
for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys”. Man are generally 
moved by the desire for fame and reputation, a kind of desire that is not 
radically different from vanity. Here Hume introduces a distinction that 
will be further clarified by Smith between aiming at being praised and 
approved and aiming at being worth of praise and approval. That shift is 
based on what Hume defines the “reverberating” or “reflective” nature 
of sympathy. Such a quality implies that we aim at gaining our own 
approval at least as we desire to obtain the other’s. Sympathy pressures 
us to see ourselves as we would appear to others, being pleased with our 
virtues and disliking our own vices. The reverberating nature of 
sympathy leads us to internalise other people's moral judgements, hence 
sympathy is responsible for the deprecation of our own vices, even 
though they are of great benefit.  
 Even more than Hume, Adam Smith considers his system of 
ethics as empirical and experimental and constructed to account in 
theoretical terms for peoples’ real behaviours. He builds his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments around some empirical assumptions. The first 
assumption is similar to Hume’s, namely,  that the most basic motive of 
social action is the desire of being loved and approved: 
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 There is a satisfaction in the consciousness of being beloved, which, to a 
person of delicacy and sensibility, is of more importance to happiness 
than all the advantage which he can expect to derive from it (…) Nature, 
when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire 
to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him 
to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. 
She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to 
him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most 
offensive  (1759/1976, III,2.1)  
 
 In Smith’s account, it is precisely such a desire that instils in each 
individual the ambition to improve its position and rank. “To be 
observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, 
complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can 
propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, 
which interests us” (I, 3. 2). But vanity and self-love alone are not 
enough to explain the genesis of social sentiments and their dynamics. It 
is necessary to introduce Smith’s second assumption which is based on 
individuals’ “separateness”. We do not have a direct experience of what 
others feel, what we have instead is the natural ability of “feeling-with 
others”, that is, of imagining ourselves as subject of others’ experiences.  
People are separated but, as postulated by Hume, tend to develop a 
desire for sociality. Such a desire is mediated by sympathy, which in 
Smith’s understanding refers to situations and not to feelings. That 
means that to sympathise with others implies not to imagine what I 
would feel in a given situation, but instead what the subject I am 
sympathising with, would feel in that situation. The extension of such an 
imaginative ability represents the basis for our self-consciousness, 
produced by our natural inclination to view ourselves as others see us. 
This concept, that seems to have an Aristotelian vein, (a consequence of 
Aristotle’s philia), is explained by Smith, when he refers to the parable of 
that imaginary man grown up in some solitary place, without any 
communication with his own species; such a man will be unable to judge 
upon his own conduct because he lacks any reference point, any example 
and definition of what is proper or improper. That is so because he is 
provided with no mirror which can present his behaviour to his own 
view. It is social life that provides such a “mirror” which, according to 
Smith, is “placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives 
with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove 
of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and 
impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own 
10
 mind” (I, 3. 1). The ultimate consequence of the activity of reciprocal 
sympathy is that the subject becomes able of self-reflection. Self-
awareness then results as an extension of our ability to feel with others 
because we evaluate ourselves as we imagine others evaluate us.  
 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never 
form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it 
were, from our own natural station and endeavour to view them as at a 
certain distance from us we can do this in no other way than by 
endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other 
people are likely to view them. (III. 1. 2)  
 
Here we see, extended and developed, Hume’s idea of the 
“reverberating” quality of sympathy. Smith clarifies the logic of 
approbation and disapprobation saying that it comes from our 
imaginative process which, fuelled by sympathy, leads us to imagine 
others’ reactions and sentiments in a given situation. Through such 
exercise we first imagine what they would feel and then decide whether 
or not to conform to them. In each particular situation, conformity of 
sentiment suggests approbation. Are others’ sentiments objective enough 
to guarantee an impartial judgement? If not, what could provide such a 
benchmark? The ability of self-approbation and self-disapprobation to 
avoid being mere conformistic sentiments,  needs to be supplemented 
with a morally objective reference point. Here Smith assumes the 
existence of a third spectator, a “cool and impartial spectator” who, 
according to the logic of sympathy, does not feel the agent’s emotion 
and sentiments to the same degree as the agent does, so that between the 
agent and the spectator a certain degree of detachment is provided to 
guarantee the desired degree of objectivity.  
The impartial spectator is a logical development of the actual spectators, 
which our imagination provides to us. Such development produces a 
“judge” and a disinterested “critic” for the agent, capable of 
counterbalancing the latter’s self-centred perspective.  
At the end of this story, we have an agent who, because of her innate 
sociality and her sentiment of sympathy, is naturally inclined to self-
evaluation. Her impartiality, of judgement, though not her absolute 
objectivity, is guaranteed by the action of the impartial spectator. 
Therefore, our actions are motivated by the desire for others’ 
approbation that we can represent to ourselves even when the others are 
physically absent. But is such a desire for praise enough? Is this 
mechanism able to account for the whole class of behaviours that Smith 
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 aims to explain? What is, at this stage, the difference between the desire 
for praise and vanity? It is at this point that Smith, in the same line as 
Hume but against Rousseau3, develops his original view, based on the 
idea that we do not want only to be praised but also, and more 
fundamentally, to be praiseworthy.  
 
Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that 
thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, 
not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the 
natural and proper object of hatred. He desires, not only praise, but 
praiseworthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised 
by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise. He 
dreads, not only blame, but blame worthiness; or to be that thing which, 
though it should be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and 
proper object of blame (III, 2.1)  
 
 Praise and praiseworthiness do not always coincide. There are 
cases where we are praised for having done things that are not 
praiseworthy and also cases where a praiseworthy action is not followed 
by any praise (the same, symmetrically, applies to blame and 
blameworthiness). In those cases where there is a conflict between the 
judgement of the self and that of the others, generally, Smith claims, the 
former prevails.  
 
Though a wise man feels little pleasure from praise where he 
knows there is no praise-worthiness, he often feels the highest in 
doing what he knows to be praise-worthy, though he knows 
equally well that no praise is ever to be bestowed upon it. To 
obtain the approbation of mankind, where no approbation is due, 
can never be an object of any importance to him (III, 2 .7). 
 
                                                 
3 Rousseau is the “great absent” of this reconstruction; I prefer to confine myself to 
the Scottish tradition for the sake of homogeneity and brevity. Nevertheless, it has 
to be noted that Rousseau was the first to make explicit that the desire for 
approbation (amour propre) is the most powerful motif of social life. While, according 
to Rousseau, l’amour propre, by inflating our ego through the eyes of the others, can 
be considered as the origin of every virtue but also of every vice, Smith sees in this 
desire of recognition a powerful remedy to the ego’s hypertrophy, through self-
command. Smith’s position, then, can be read as a reaction to Rousseau’s original 
formulation.       
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  The fil rouge of the story I have briefly sketched is represented by 
the centrality of the desire for being loved and approved, as a primary, if 
not unique, source of motivation. From Aristotle’s philautia, to Smith’s 
praiseworthiness, this concept has been somehow morally purified from 
any residual of selfishness. According to Smith, in fact, such a desire 
cannot be considered neither selfish, nor self-centred, as it is based on 
the imaginative act of getting out of the self to get into others’ 
contingencies. Precisely such an imaginative leap should be considered as 
the rationale for trustworthiness as it is depicted in the trust 
responsiveness mechanism.  
 
 
5. The Self-reflective nature of trustworthiness. 
 
Following this line of thought,  I suggest that trust responsiveness is 
ultimately grounded on the subject’s ability of self-reflection. Such an 
ability cannot be entirely internally generated, it arises in fact from the 
relationship with the other, the other that, as we have seen from 
Aristotle to Adam Smith, represents the mirror of our self.  
 In the study of trust, at least when considered in the narrow 
sense that I am considering here,  the real puzzle, what is hard to explain 
with the traditional tools of rational choice theory, is not why we decide 
to trust someone, but instead why who has been trusted upon decides to 
be trustworthy. In fact, once I happen to know that you have good 
reasons to be  trustworthy, explaining my being trustful becomes trivial. 
What is intriguing, then, is to find a rationale for trustworthiness when 
those good reasons are, by no means, manifest. 
 The trust responsiveness hypothesis suggests that some of the 
reasons for being trustworthy arise from the mere fact of being the 
object of someone else’s trust. Smith’s idea of self-reflection may 
constitute the starting point for providing a potential justification for 
that proposition. It has to be noticed that Smith’s argument is only the 
starting point of my tentative rationalisation of trustworthy behaviour. 
I’m going further, in fact, with respect to his original construction, by 
assuming that the desire for being praised and the desire for being 
worthy of praise are two distinct, if related, sources of motivation. It is 
disputed whether in Smith’s Theory those two elements could be 
interpreted in this way or, on the contrary, they have to be considered 
somehow consequential.  
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  Let us assume that there are two subjects, A and B; let them 
interact in a situation similar to  the Trust Game. A moves first; 
according to game theory she should end the game there by being 
prudently distrustful. Suppose instead that she decides to opt for the 
trustful strategy. Again, game theory tells us that B, with certainty, will be 
opportunistic. Suppose again that against such a prediction he decides to 
play trustworthily. Let’s try to rationalise what kind of reasoning may 
motivate B to resist the temptation of the opportunistic move. 
 Firstly, let’s assume that B is interested in the material payoff. 
Secondly, let’s assume that he is interested in A’s opinion as well. We 
know from Hume and Smith that subjects have an innate desire for the 
good opinion of the others and they also have the ability, through 
imagination, of changing their point of view with that of the others. 
Having observed her move, B may ask himself why A has been trustful. 
The reasons could be many, but if we rule out masochistic or ideally 
altruistic ones, all should be based on the expectation of a trustworthy 
response. At this stage, B imagines that A has such an  expectation. What 
could be the rationale for such an expectation? B does not know; all he 
knows is that for having played trustfully, A thinks B is trustworthy. To 
be trusted, in fact, is to be told that one is believed to be trustworthy. 
Now B knows that A believes him to be trustworthy. At this stage B has 
two options: being trustworthy or let A down by being opportunistic. In 
thinking about such options, B considers two different orders of 
judgements: first, he tries to imagine A’s reaction to both responses. 
Given her prior expectation, A will be satisfied with the former choice 
and frustrated by the latter. Because of our innate desire for the good 
opinion of the others, B knows that such reactions will have, 
respectively, a positive or a negative impact on A’s opinion of him and 
therefore on B’s “vanity”. That first order of judgement affects what we 
may understand as B’s desire for praise. There is also a second order of 
judgements, and precisely that coming from our own self-appraisal. 
Nature, in fact, has made us desire not only to be praised, but to deserve 
praise. This is, our concern about what an impartial and well-informed 
spectator would think and feel about what we are doing, and not just 
about the reactions of our actual spectators. In Smith’s argument, the 
impartial spectator seems to provide a detached and objective standpoint 
from  which the actor can look at her own conduct in a way which is 
“purified” from the self-centredness that ordinarily affects agents’ 
judgement. I suggest that such a second order judgement will affect not 
simply B’s desire for praise, but instead his desire for praiseworthiness, 
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 ultimately B’s self-esteem4 and not his vanity, as in the previous case. At 
this point, then, B has to compare the net effect of the material gains and 
the psychological losses, attached to his available options: the material 
gain and the psychological loss from having been opportunistic, or the 
material loss and the psychological gain from having been trustworthy. 
What is important to notice here, is that the psychological impact has 
two sources: it does not derive only from A’s idea of B, conditional to 
his actions, but also, and I think principally, from B’s idea of his own 
action, as it appears from the external standpoint of the impartial 
spectator. This interpretation of Smith’s theory of motivation seems to 
be supported by several pages of the Theory, where he clearly 
distinguishes between “those two tribunals”, the action of the “man 
within” and that of the “man without” (II, 2. 32-33).  
 
 The mechanism of self-evaluation works in two stages. In the 
first, the impartial spectator determines the balance between the actor’s 
(B) interest as agent and the spectator’s (A). In the second, the impartial 
spectator determines B’s conscience towards the action, according to 
what determined in the first stage. This mechanism provides what may 
be termed as internal psychological reasons to action. At the same time B 
perceives or imagines what kind of reaction A may express towards B’s 
action. These are the external psychological reasons for B’s action. Thus, 
B is in relation with two subjects, A and the “impartial spectator”; 
moreover, it is influenced by the reactions of both. In this sense B’s 
action is determined by three orders of motives: first, his direct material 
interest; second, A’s approbation or disapprobation; third, his own self-
approbation or disapprobation as derived from the perspective of the 
spectator. This motivational structure is neither narrowly self-interested, 
because it takes account of A’s interests, nor narrowly self-centred, 
because it is partially determined by the action of the spectator that is 
detached and impartial. According to this mechanism, our actions are 
assessed and determined by the consequences that they produce on us, 
both internally and externally. The internal reasons are those related to 
our sense of worth; the external reasons are those related to our vanity. 
These two sources of motivation account for the difference that exists 
                                                 
4 Here I am using the concept of “self-esteem” as a product of a process of 
interactive self-valuing, that is one beginning with the relation with the other and, by 
extrapolation, getting to a certain conclusion regarding the relation with himself. The 
way in which we may value others is extended to the way which the self valus itself.  
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 between having a desire for conformity to the others’ expectation 
because of the fear of the others’ reaction, and having the same desire 
because of intrinsic reasons, related to one’s own sense of worth. Trust 
responsiveness is based on both. In fact, this composite nature can 
explain why, for instance, we observe trustworthiness even in 
anonymous interactions, that is, when A’s reaction cannot be directly 
observed. In such a situation, the action of the internal reasons may still 
counterbalance the subjects’ material self-interest. Similarly, B does not 
directly perceive A’s reaction, but he still may be able to imagine it. By 
the same means B may imagine A’s reaction even before making a 
certain action. For the same reason, the internal reasons take place 
independently of the fact that A’s judgement is expressed or not. It 
seems that such an assessment has the same necessity as a knee-jerk. 
 Thus, the actual choice results as the compound effect of 
material self-interest, others’ approbation or disapprobation and a 
personal sense of worth. Self-worth is a second order construct. It 
derives from the good opinion of the self, which, in turn, she derives 
from the impartial spectator’s approval.  
 I suggest that trustworthiness arises whenever material self-
interest is offset by the desire for others’ approval and for self-
worthiness. By being trustful you tell me that I am trustworthy; I want to 
fulfil such a belief because I want to be praised, certainly by you, but 
principally by myself.  
 From what I have being saying it should not be derived that 
“being trustworthy”, in the sense of meeting someone else’s expectation, 
is something that is generally approved. Think about this example: A and 
B are co-workers.  Some job has to be done today, and it is really A’s 
responsibility, but A sneaks off before the end of the day, leaving B to 
do the job.  A’s action implies that A believes that B will do the job. Is B 
to be considered trustworthy if he responds to A’s expectations? I would 
not say so. In this case in fact, A’s trust is presumptuous. That means 
that by being trustful, A is not signalling a good opinion of B, quite the 
contrary. B’s actions should be considered trustworthy, when they 
confirm A’s expectation (signalled by a trustful move) but only when 
that follows from a good opinion of A. 
 The peculiar nature of trustworthiness emerges from what I said 
so far: it is, in fact, neither self-centred, because it is based on the other’s 
imagined reactions, nor completely other-regarding, because it is not 
based exclusively on the other’s opinion. I think the best way to denote 
the nature of trustworthiness is by using the term “relational”. It comes 
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 about, in fact, as a product of the action of self-reflection, which in turn 
arises from the relation with others, others as a mirror of the self. 
 
 
6. Responsive trust is relational 
 
In this section I shall try to discuss and compare some of the main 
distinctive features of the trust responsiveness hypothesis, in particular 
those features that distinguish it, theoretically and observationally, from 
other explicative principles and theories. 
 Let me summarise schematically the reasoning process 
underlying the mechanism of trust responsiveness: suppose there are two 
players, A and B. A moves first and B observes A’s choice; we know 
that: 
1. B is interested in what A thinks of him; 
2. if such an opinion is a good (bad) one, B experiences an increase 
(decrease) in utility deriving both from A’s actualised good (bad) 
opinion [external reasons] and from his increased (decreased) 
sense of worth [internal reasons]; 
3. if A trusts (behaves trustfully towards) B, she is signalling a good 
opinion of B. She implicitly expects a non-opportunistic 
behaviour from B; 
4. if B responds in a way that confirms (disconfirms) her 
expectation, B’s psychological utility will increase (decrease) 
because of the net effect of external (A’s) and internal (impartial 
spectator’s)  positive (negative) consequences of B’s actions; 
5. such a psychological gain (loss) has to be weighed with the 
material gain or loss.  
6. A knows that B has a desire for A’s good opinion and wants to 
increase his own sense of worth; 
7. A anticipates that, if the material loss is not too great, such a 
desire will be satisfied by a trustworthy behaviour; 
8. all those points are common knowledge. 
 
 Let’s consider first the differences that separate trust 
responsiveness from traditional Rational Choice Theory. Whether it 
seems plausible to consider the psychological motivation arising from 
being the object of others' trust, as comparable and additive to the 
material incentives involved in the trusting relation, it is impossible to 
describe, a priori, the overall utility (material and psychological) before 
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 the interaction begins. That is precisely what the position sometimes 
called “tautologism” would suggest in order to reconcile “anomalous” 
empirical observations and standard theory (Binmore, 1998). 
 As I have already stressed, the mechanism of trust 
responsiveness is a mechanism of endogenous payoff formation. One 
does not know which are the players’ real payoffs (only the material ones 
are known) before the game is actually played. What one may come to 
know is how the psychological part of players’ utility is formed by the 
material one and by the conjunct effect of the players’ actions and (first 
and second order) beliefs. This process of endogenisation of the payoffs 
makes trust responsiveness ontologically non-reducible to the traditional 
Rational Choice Theory’s and Game Theory’s conceptual categories. 
According to the Rational Choice Theory, in fact, all the “exotic forms 
of reasoning”, like those based on reciprocity and trust, should be 
considered as redundant and unnecessary. One does not need to 
introduce reciprocity, kindness, and trust, to explain the anomalous 
players' behaviour in certain games; all one has to do is observe people’s 
decisions and then write down the right payoff matrix. Trust, reciprocity, 
altruism and all the conceivable motives for action can be more easily 
included in the right game's payoffs.  
 I do not think that such criticism is completely ungrounded, 
however, if we were to push it to its extreme consequences we would 
incur the risk of throwing the baby with the bathwater. We should 
renounce, in fact, every ambition of a real understanding of the 
principles that ultimately rule a strategic interaction. A game could not 
even be described before having seen the players playing it. Such a 
radical position transforms the subject into a black box, depriving, in this 
way, the theory of any explicative ambition and confining it to the realms 
of mere observation and description.  
 There are, however, other direct and strong reasons why the idea 
of trust responsiveness escapes such a criticism. The “exotic” motivating 
elements characterising all the non-consequentialist principles, such as 
"trust responsiveness", based on the role of intentions, cannot be 
subsumed in the same numerical index that payoffs represent in 
Binmore’s interpretation.  
 Whereas Binmore’s objection may be referred to simpler cases, 
for instance altruism and inequity aversion theories, where second order 
beliefs are at work this is no longer valid. Second order beliefs and 
emotional reactions turn out to be endogenous and no single set of 
payoffs can adequately summarise the whole strategic situation. 
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 Consequently, standard game theory results in not being well suited to 
analyse situations contaminated by such beliefs dependent on 
psychological considerations as surprise, confidence, gratitude, 
disappointment, embarrassment, and so on. To analyse such situations 
properly we have to use psychological games. A psychological game is 
characterised by the fact that payoffs depend on each players’ strategy 
choices, but also on what each player thinks.  
 The only two motivating elements considered by traditional 
game theory are utility and beliefs, that is, payoffs and subjective 
probabilities. If we assume that players seek to maximise the product of 
these two entities, there can be only two motivating elements, namely, 
the utility associated with different outcomes (exogenous) and the 
probability associated with other players' different strategies 
(endogenous). Traditional game theory  also considers higher order 
beliefs (as logically different from first order beliefs), but such higher 
order beliefs are endogenous and do not have any motivating effect on 
players’ choices. Here lies the main difference, since for trust 
responsiveness, second order beliefs exert a direct motivating force. In 
those theories, in fact, A’s strategy choice is determined by A’s beliefs 
about B’s choice and by A’s beliefs about B’s beliefs about A’s choice; 
whereas in traditional game theory the choice depends only on A’s 
beliefs about B’s choice. While consequences normally ranked using 
payoffs are exogenous, expectations depending on second order beliefs 
are endogenous and therefore the latter cannot be incorporated into the 
former. 
 Let me consider now the differences between trust 
responsiveness and the idea of reciprocity as it is conceived in Matthew 
Rabin’s model of reciprocating fairness (Rabin, 1993). Both reciprocity 
and trust responsiveness are principles of norm-guided behaviour. Under 
certain conditions such norms may offset the effect of material payoff in 
the individual decision making. The effect of reciprocity and trust 
responsiveness may lead the subject to act in a way that appears to be 
contrary to her material self-interest. Both principles have an element of 
reciprocity since that is a hallmark of all norm-guided behaviour. They 
differ over the content of such norms, in particular over the mechanism 
that elicits the individual’s psychological utility.  
 The idea of reciprocity is ultimately based on the joint effects of 
material and psychological incentives. I am not saying here simply that in 
players' overall utility both material and psychological incentives co-exist, 
that is true by definition both for reciprocity and trust responsiveness. 
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 What I am saying is that the motivation that triggers (positive or 
negative) reciprocal behaviour is based on material incentives. The 
perceived kindness that elicits reciprocal behaviour is a measure of 
material benefit that an agent's choice attributes to another player.  
 Precisely following this logic, Rabin formalises the idea that I 
feel somehow motivated to reciprocate when, from your expected 
action, I can get a material payoff higher than the equitable one (which 
constitutes a measure of fair distribution). Such an increase refers to 
material payoffs. Acting in a way which repays (ignores) such an 
expected material gain leads me to a psychological gain (loss).  
 The trust responsiveness hypothesis, on the contrary, is 
exclusively based on a psychological-moral motivation. It is the (trustful) 
action that produces reasons for the trustee to behave trustworthily, and 
not the potential beneficial consequences for her material wealth that she 
may derive from it. You manifest to me your expectation on my 
behaviour, if I consciously fulfil (frustrate) it, I get an increase (decrease) 
in my psychological payoff. Put another way, while reciprocity in Rabin’s 
theory is the act of conferring benefits on people who have previously 
materially benefited you, trust responsiveness is the act of conferring 
benefits on people who have shown that they expect you to do so, and 
have willingly exposed themselves to harm in the event that you act on 
material self-interest.  
 Such a difference becomes clear when one considers a certain 
class of situations where reciprocity and trust responsiveness-based 
behaviours are not observationally equivalent.  
Consider the logic of reciprocity applied to the particular variant of Trust 
Game depicted  in figure 2a below.  
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Figure 2a.  
The Trust Game  
      
    Player A 
 
   L         R 
      
        Player B 
 
           L        R   
     
5        0       10 
5       15      10 
 
 
 
Figure 2b.  
The Gratuitous Trust Game  
 
          Player A 
 
   L   R 
      
         Player B 
 
            L        R   
     
 5       0       10 
10     15      10
 
 
 We know that reciprocity takes the form of returning kindness 
for kindness and unkindness for unkindness. In this game that means 
that if A expects B to play R, then A playing R is perceived as kind by B 
who in turn feels motivated to play R. Consider now the instance of the 
Trust Game depicted in figure 2b. What result would the logic of 
reciprocity produce in this particular game? Now, in fact, if A expects B 
to play R, A playing R does not provide any benefit to B, if B expects A 
to play R, therefore the logic of reciprocity would suggest B to play L, 
straight away. 
 What about trust responsiveness? If, on the contrary, we 
consider a trust responsive B player, we would observe him playing R in 
both situations, despite the difference in the material benefits he would 
obtain from A's move. 
I have labelled the latter particular form of trust game as the "Gratuitous 
Trust Game", expressly to emphasise that in this game any instance of 
co-operative behaviour cannot be thought as an exchange of material 
benefits.  
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 These examples shed light on the difference between trust 
responsiveness and reciprocity on the issue of material/non material 
incentives to action. 
 However, there is a more basic distinction between reciprocity 
and trust responsiveness that refers to the different degrees of 
relationality or interpersonal responsiveness. In Rabin's theory, in fact, 
such an interpersonal responsiveness takes the form of being kind to 
someone who has been kind to us and to punish who has been mean. 
We have emphasised the limits of this logic with the example of the 
Gratuitous Trust Game. In that situation, since A would receive some 
benefit from her playing R, provided that B would in turn play R, such a 
move cannot be perceived as kind, and therefore cannot call for 
positively reciprocal behaviour from B. But although A has not been 
kind to B, she has nevertheless trusted him. That emphasises the fact 
that reciprocal kindness seems to appear as a subclass of trust responsive 
behaviour. 
 
  
7. Conclusions. 
 
According to John Locke, trust and trustworthiness represent the 
vinculum societatis, the bond of society. They are crucial to the sustaining of 
a well ordered community and even to the efficient functioning of the 
market. In this paper we have explored the idea of trust responsiveness, 
a mechanism according to which trustworthiness may be elicited by trust. 
Trustworthiness appears grounded on the subjects’ ability of self-valuing. 
This paper provides a philosophically oriented discussion of the sources 
of such an idea. In particular, I have tried to trace back its roots in the 
anthropological models developed first by Aristotle but especially by 
Hume and Smith, who suggest that our most basic reasons for action are 
grounded both on our desire for others’ approval and, more intensely, 
on our desire for our own. The “degree of relationality” is discussed and 
used to distinguish between trust responsiveness and other 
observationally equivalent explanations of trust.  
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